



January 28, 2026

Chair Adam Ebbin
Senate General Laws and Technology Committee
Senate Room B, General Assembly Building
201 N 9th St
Richmond, VA 23219

RE: SB 338 (Perry) – Location Privacy Act – SUPPORT

Dear Chair Ebbin,

The undersigned organizations write in strong support of S.B. 338, legislation that would ban the sale of consumers' precise geolocation information. Geolocation can be incredibly useful for pro-consumer applications such as turn-by-turn directions and finding a nearby restaurant; however, all too often this information is secretly collected and shared by dozens if not hundreds of ad networks and data brokers with whom consumers have no relationship or even awareness. This bill will provide straightforward, powerful, and critically important protections for the privacy, autonomy, and physical safety of Virginians while still giving advertisers plenty of leeway to reach customers.

The location data market is a multi-billion-dollar industry¹ centered on collecting and selling people's everyday comings and goings, often collected from people's mobile devices and often without their knowledge or explicit consent. Location data is an extremely sensitive form of personal data. Researchers have shown that 95 percent of individuals can be uniquely identified from just four spatio-temporal points; most companies that collect this information have orders of magnitude more data than that.² This activity poses a host of significant risks to Virginia residents.

Much of this data is amassed by data brokers, entities that aggregate extensive dossiers on virtually every American that include thousands of data points, including extremely granular

¹ Jon Keegan and Alfred Ng, The Markup, There's a Multibillion-Dollar Market for Your Phone's Location Data, (September 30, 2021), <https://themarkup.org/privacy/2021/09/30/theres-a-multibillion-dollar-market-for-your-phones-location-data>

² Yves-Alexander de Montjoye et al., Scientific Reports, vol. 3, art. no. 1376, Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility, (March 25, 2013), <https://www.nature.com/articles/srep01376>

information about people's behavior, as well as their inferences about individuals based on this existing data.³ Some companies collect and share consumers' location data as often as every three seconds.⁴ This information is then sold and resold, often for marketing but for a variety of other purposes as well, eroding consumers' basic expectation of privacy in the process.⁵

It is especially imperative that we protect the privacy rights of our communities at a time of increasing attacks on immigrants, minority community members, LGBTQ people, and individuals seeking reproductive health care. Virginia must take bold action to ensure consumers are protected and their location information is secure. AB 338 answers this call.

A few additional examples of location data driven harms include:

- ***Scamming, stalking, and spying.*** Fraudsters and other bad actors can use location data brokers to target vulnerable individuals for scams, or otherwise use personal information to cause harm. For example, scammers can use commercially available location data to increase the specificity of their phishing or social engineering scams, such as by including location-specific details, like mentioning a nearby business or the individual's recent activity.⁶ Location data brokers are also commonly used by abusive individuals to locate people, hunt them down, and stalk, harass, intimidate, assault, or even murder them.⁷
- ***Predatory use of consumer data.*** Data brokers sell data about people who rarely even know the companies even exist—and who have rarely ever affirmatively, expressly consented to this data collection and sale. In some instances, this can result in financially disastrous consequences for consumers. Some data brokers sell lists of consumers sorted by characteristics like “Rural and Barely Making It” and “Credit Crunched: City Families,” which can be used to target individuals most likely to be

³ See, e.g., Joseph Cox, The Secret Weapon Hackers Can Use to Dox Nearly Anyone in America for \$15, 404 Media (Aug. 22, 2023), <https://www.404media.co/the-secret-weapon-hackers-can-use-to-dox-nearly-anyone-in-america-for-15-tlo-usinfosearch-transunion/>;

Douglas MacMillan, Data Brokers are Selling Your Secrets. How States are Trying to Stop Them, Wash. Post (Jun. 24, 2019), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/06/24/data-brokers-are-getting-rich-by-selling-your-secrets-how-states-are-trying-stop-them/>.

⁴ Federal Trade Commission, FTC Takes Action Against General Motors for Sharing Drivers' Precise Location and Driving Behavior Data Without Consent, (January 14, 2025), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/01/ftc-takes-action-against-general-motors-sharing-drivers-precise-location-driving-behavior-data>

⁵ Big Data, A Big Disappointment for Scoring Consumer Credit Risk, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr. at 15-16 (Mar. 2014), <https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-big-data.pdf>.

⁶ Phishing Box, Tracking Data: Identifying the Anonymized, <https://www.phishingbox.com/news/post/tracking-data-identifying-anonymized>

⁷ Justin Sherman, Lawfare, People Search Data Brokers, Stalking, and 'Publicly Available Information' Carve-Outs, (October 30, 2023), <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/people-search-data-brokers-stalking-and-publicly-available-information-on-carve-outs>

susceptible to scams or other predatory products.⁸ And a recent case brought by the Texas Attorney General alleged that Arity, a data broker owned by the insurance company Allstate, secretly harvested information about consumers' driving behaviors (including their precise geolocation data), which it used in some cases to raise consumers' premiums or deny them coverage altogether.⁹ They also sold the driving data to several other insurance companies without consumers' knowledge or consent.

- ***Enhanced risks of data breaches.*** Data brokers collect trillions of data points on Americans, so they are unsurprisingly a top target for hackers and cyber criminals. Location data broker Gravy Analytics, which has claimed to “collect, process and curate” more than 17 billion signals from people’s smartphones every day,¹⁰ reportedly suffered a massive data breach that may have leaked the location data of millions of individuals.¹¹ This type of data makes it trivially easy to reconstruct the everyday comings and goings of individuals, politicians, and even servicemembers.¹²

Unsurprisingly, the advertising industry that profits off this predatory use of consumer data strongly opposes threats to their ill-gotten gains. They offer a number of misleading arguments about why these protections are not needed or are unprecedented. But ultimately businesses do not need to purchase Virginians’ ***precise*** geolocation data in order to effectively advertise. And most of the large companies that traffic in location data already have to be compliant with the protections included in SB 338 due to the passage of similar laws elsewhere, including in Oregon and Maryland. Several other states, including Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, and Washington are considering similar protections.

We offer some additional context on some of the advertising industry’s key arguments here:

- ***“VCDPA already protects precise geolocation data.”***

⁸ Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Protecting Americans from Harmful Data Broker Practices (Regulation V), Proposed Rule; request for public comment, (December 3, 2024), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_nprm-protecting-ams-from-harmful-data-broker-practices_2024-12.pdf

⁹ Office of the Texas Attorney General, Attorney General Ken Paxton Sues Allstate and Arity for Unlawfully Collecting, Using, and Selling Over 45 Million Americans’ Driving Data to Insurance Companies, (January 13, 2025), <https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/press/Allstate%20and%20Arity%20Petition%20Filed.pdf>

¹⁰ Federal Trade Commission, FTC Takes Action Against Gravy Analytics, Venntel for Unlawfully Selling Location Data Tracking Consumers to Sensitive Sites, (December 3, 2024), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/2123035gravyanalyticscomplaint.pdf

¹¹ Joseph Cox, 404Media, Hackers Claim Massive Breach of Location Data Giant, Threaten to Leak Data, (January 7, 2025), <https://www.404media.co/hackers-claim-massive-breach-of-location-data-giant-threaten-to-leak-data/>

¹² Justin Sherman et al., Duke Sanford School of Public Policy, Data Brokers and the Sale of Data on U.S. Military Personnel, (November 2023), <https://techpolicy.sanford.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2023/11/Sherman-et-al-2023-Data-Brokers-and-the-Sale-of-Data-on-US-Military-Personnel.pdf>

Opt-in frameworks, like the one currently in VCDPA, are not robust enough to prevent businesses from selling location data behind consumers' backs. While it is true that businesses must obtain opt-in consent to process location data under VCDPA, in practice many businesses *require* you to consent to the sale of your location data as a condition of using the service. In other words, they are not required to obtain separate consent for functionally necessary data collection (e.g. a weather app collecting location to provide an accurate forecast) versus unnecessary secondary sharing (e.g. a weather app selling location to data brokers). Instead, consumers are often presented with a single take-it-or-leave-it consent box that they have to complete if they want to use the product. This type of coercive structure fails to meaningfully protect consumers. Instead of relying on a flimsy pretext of informed "consent," the law should simply ban harmful practices, like the sale of precise geolocation data.

- ***"SB 338 will prevent consumers from receiving desired location-based services, like geotargeted coupons."***

A ban on sale of precise geolocation data would not stop consumers from receiving desired location-based services, such as turn-by-turn directions, ads for local businesses, or coupons. Under this bill, businesses are still free to collect consumers' location data, with clear, affirmative consent, to advertise to them — they just can't sell that data to other businesses. Furthermore, businesses that wish to buy or sell consumers' location information for advertising purposes can ultimately still do so, albeit in a more privacy-protecting way. Precise geolocation is defined in VCDPA as information that directly identifies the specific location of a natural person with precision and accuracy within a radius of 1,750 feet — close enough to identify someone's home address. Instead, businesses could still leverage data at the town, city, or zipcode level. For example, advertisers could advertise based on a consumer's general location, such as "Richmond area."

- ***"SB 338 ignores the very valuable role that geolocation data plays in anti-fraud and law enforcement functions."***

Nothing in this bill prevents anti-fraud or law enforcement functions. VCDPA already includes a number of exemptions for anti-fraud and law enforcement, including that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict a controller's or processor's ability to... [p]revent, detect, protect against, or respond to security incidents, identity theft, fraud, harassment, malicious or deceptive activities, or any illegal activity."¹³ And once again, this bill is about the commercial sale of location data, not the collection of it. Anti-fraud entities and law enforcement are free to lawfully collect precise geolocation, as well as to leverage it for their own purposes.

- ***"SB 338 will burden low-income consumers. Monetizing user data is critical to the advertising-supported ecosystem that makes many apps free to users."***

Free iPhone apps that secretly sell consumers' location data are not a serious cost-of-living issue, while the *actual* costs to consumers of the unfettered sale of their location data can be

¹³ Section 59.1-582 (A)(7)

severe. Aside from the risks of identity theft, stalking, or predatory marketing described above, businesses are increasingly seeking to use information like location data as an input into “surveillance pricing” algorithms.¹⁴ These systems use extensive data-driven profiling to assess consumers’ personal situations so that they can charge them closer to their maximum willingness to pay and commercial location data brokers are a key cog in that machine.

Ultimately, some types of data are simply too sensitive to allow commercial entities to buy and sell. Granular data about our everyday comings and goings — which reveals the location of our homes, friends’ homes, places of worship, political causes we support, medical services we seek out, and more — is clearly one of those.

For the above reasons, we are proud to support S.B. 338 and urge the Legislature to pass it.

Sincerely,

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¹⁴ FTC Surveillance Pricing 6(b) Study: Research Summaries A Staff Perspective, (January 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/p246202_surveillancepricing6bstudy_researchsummaries_redacted.pdf